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Repairable Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
Xuan Guang Member, IEEE, Jiyong Lu Student Member, IEEE, and Fang-Wei Fu
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a class of threshold secret sharing schemes with repairing function between
shares without the help of the dealer, that we called repairable threshold secret sharing schemes. Specifi-
cally, if a share fails, such as broken or lost, it will be repaired just by some other shares. A construction
of such repairable threshold secret sharing schemes is designed by applying linearized polynomials and
regenerating codes in distributed storage systems. In addition, a new repairing rate is introduced to
characterize the performance and efficiency of the repairing function. Then an achievable upper bound
on the repairing rate is derived, which implies the optimality of the repair and describes the security
between different shares. Under this optimality of the repair, we further discuss traditional information
rate and also indicate its optimality, that can describe the efficiency of secret sharing schemes in the aspect
of storage. Finally, by applying the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes, our construction
designs repairable threshold secret sharing schemes achieving both optimal repairing and information
rates simultaneously.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to keep a secret (usually a cryptographic key) highly reliable and secure, Blakley [2] and
Shamir [13] presented the concept of threshold secret sharing scheme in 1979 independently. In Shamir’s
(t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer shares a secret S to n participants P1, P2, · · · , Pn. He
first generates n shares of the secret S, denoted by S1, S2, · · · , Sn, and then distributes Si to Pi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n such that any t or more participants are able to recover the secret S together (say the recovery
property) and any t− 1 or less participants obtain no information about the secret S (called the perfectly
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secure property). It is easy to see that this (t, n) threshold scheme is highly reliable and secure for the
secret S, since it can resist up to n− t erasure errors or the leakage of up to t− 1 shares. McEliece and
Sarwate [9] indicated the close relationship between Shamir’s (t, n) threshold scheme and [n, t] Reed-
Solomon codes [8]. Lai and Ding [5] proposed several generalizations of Shamir’s threshold scheme in
2004. Recently, new generalizations of threshold secret sharing schemes by using integer polymatroids
were proposed by Farra`s et al. [4]. Benaloh and Leichter [1] introduced the “weighted secret sharing
scheme” to assign multiple shares rather than a single share to some participants. In [11], Nojoumian et
al. introduced the notion of social secret sharing scheme to renew shares of a participant based on his
“reputation”. Furthermore, for the“one time” problem of lots of secret sharing schemes, meaning that the
secret and shares are known to everyone after a public secret recovery process, Nojoumian and Stinson
[10] provided threshold schemes to generate new secrets dynamically in the absence of the dealer.
In addition, for practical applications, sometimes the share of a participant will fail such as destroyed
or lost. So how to recover the failed share in order to keep the stability and the robustness of the system
is meaningful and interesting. One natural approach is to request the dealer to regenerate and redistribute
an appropriate share to the corresponding participant whose original share fails. But it is not difficult
to see that this approach has a plenty of shortcomings. For instances, it has to seek the help of the
dealer, and the dealer must maintain the original secret and the regenerating and redistributing functions
to obtain a new share for the corresponding participant. Moreover, it possibly costs a lot to request the
service of the dealer in practice. Thus, in order to avoid these shortcomings, we are eager to construct a
new secret sharing scheme with repairing function, where the failed share can be repaired only by some
other participants without the help of the dealer, and meanwhile, the properties of recovery and perfect
security of the system are still guaranteed.
Motivated by the goal as mentioned above, the recent research on regenerating codes in distributed
storage systems [3] may be feasible to solve our problem since regenerating codes have a better repairing
property. To be specific, in a distributed storage system of n storage nodes P1, P2, · · · , Pn, let M be the
original data, regarded as an |M |-dimensional row vector. An (n, k, d) regenerating code with parameters
(α, β) and an |M |×nα generator matrix G = [G1, G2, · · · , Gn] is used to distribute the original data M to
the n storage nodes, where each Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is an |M |×α submatrix of G. Subsequently, each storage
node Pi stores α symbols by computing M ·Gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This regenerating code should satisfy the
requirements that any k nodes can recover the original data M and any d intact nodes can repair a failed
node by providing β symbols (encoded usually) from each intact one. In particular, the parameters of
(n, k, d) regenerating codes satisfy the equation |M | =
∑k−1
i=0 min{α, (d− i)β}. Furthermore, Dimakis et
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al. in [3] defined two special classes of regenerating codes, the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR)
codes satisfying α = dβ which guarantee the minimum of the total transmitted symbols for repair, and
the minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes satisfying α = (d− k+1)β which ensure the minimum
of the stored symbols for each node. More works about MBR codes and MSR codes can be referred to
[12] and [7].
Although the goals of secret sharing schemes and distributed storage systems are totally different, one
for sharing the secret and the other for storing the data, the requirements of recovering the secret and
the original data are similar. In addition, the repairing property of regenerating codes may be helpful to
accomplish the repairing function of a secret sharing scheme. Therefore, we naturally try to combine a
regenerating code and a threshold secret sharing scheme to obtain a secret sharing schemes with repairing
function. Review the construction of Shamir’s (t, n) threshold scheme, which firstly selects at random a
polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i of degree t− 1 over a finite field Fq, where a0 = s is considered as the
secret, and then generates n evaluations si = f(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for n distinct participants. Our initial
and natural idea is to concatenate the Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme and a regenerating code
directly. More specifically, we first use f(x) = s +
∑t−1
i=1 aix
i to generate t distinct evaluations, which
together can recover the secret s. Then regard the t evaluations as original data in distributed systems and
use an (n, k, d) regenerating code to obtain n distinct shares for all n participants. Clearly, the regenerating
code can ensure the repair of any failed share, and any k participants can recover all t evaluations, further
recover the secret s. However, it is very unfortunate that the fundamental perfectly secure property is
no more satisfied for most cases. Particularly, a specific example will be given to show this point in
the next section. Thus, we have to reconsider this problem. In this paper, we propose an innovative
construction of repairable threshold secret sharing schemes by applying linearized polynomials as an
important component, which can qualify all desired properties, particularly, perfectly secure property.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally define repairable
threshold secret sharing schemes and propose a feasible construction. Further, the functions, including
recovery function and repairing function, and perfectly secure property of the proposed construction are
analyzed in detail. In Section III, in order to analyze the performance of repairable threshold secret
sharing schemes, we introduce a new repairing rate to characterize the efficiency of repairing function
and derive its tight upper bound. Subsequently, we also discuss the traditional information rate when
the optimal repairing rate is achieved, which describes the efficiency of the storage for each participant.
Furthermore, we show that the repairable threshold schemes obtained by our construction can achieve
both types of the optimality by applying MBR codes. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section IV.
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II. REPAIRABLE THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In this section, we will discuss repairable threshold secret sharing schemes in detail. As mentioned in
the above section, our initial and natural idea is to directly combine Shamir’s threshold scheme and a
regenerating code to obtain a repairable threshold secret sharing scheme. Specifically, for a given secret
s, we first select a polynomial f(x) = s +
∑t−1
i=1 aix
i of degree t − 1 at random over a finite field Fq,
and then we compute t distinct evaluations of f(x), denoted by y1, y2, · · · , yt. After that, use an (n, k, d)
regenerating code with generator matrix G = [G1, G2, · · · , Gn] to distribute these t evaluations. Hence,
the shares are obtained by computing si = [y1, · · · , yt] ·Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all n participants. Evidently,
this scheme satisfies the following: (i) any k or more participants can recover the t evaluations, and
further recover the secret s by polynomial interpolation. (ii) any failed share can be repaired successfully
by any other d participants because of the repairing property of the regenerating code. But unfortunately,
the necessary perfectly secure property is no longer satisfied as what the following example illustrates.
Example 1: A secret s in the finite field F11 needs to be shared among 4 participants P1, P2, P3, P4. In
the following, we give a (t = 2, n = 4) threshold secret sharing scheme by combining Shamir’s threshold
scheme and an (n = 4, k = 2, d = 3) regenerating code directly. At first, randomly select 3 elements
a1, a2, a3 in F11 independently and uniformly. Then define a polynomial:
f(x) = s+
3∑
j=1
aj · x
j ∈ F11[x].
Then, calculate yi = f(xi), where xi = i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 ∈ F11, and all of xi are public. Use a (4, 2, 3)
regenerating code with the public generator matrix
G = [G1|G2|G3|G4] =


1 0 0 0 0 5 1 1
0 1 0 0 2 1 9 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 2 4
0 0 0 1 1 3 0 4


to generate the share si of participant Pi by computing
si = [y1, y2, y3, y4] ·Gi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Thus, we obtain
s1 = [y1, y2], s2 = [y3, y4],
s3 = [2y2 + y3 + y4, 5y1 + y2 + y3 + 3y4],
s4 = [y1 + 9y2 + 2y3, y1 + 4y3 + 4y4].
September 4, 2018 DRAFT
REPAIRABLE THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING SCHEMES 5
By the knowledge of regenerating codes, it is apparent to verify that any 2 or more participants can
recover the secret s and any failed share can be repaired by any other 3 shares. But this threshold
scheme isn’t perfectly secure for the secret s as analyzed below. Take P3 for example, whose share s3
is [2y2 + y3 + y4, 5y1 + y2 + y3 + 3y4]. Substituting yi = s+
∑3
j=1 aj · i
j
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 ∈ F11, we have
the following two linear equations:


2y2 + y3 + y4 = 4s + 8a3,
5y1 + y2 + y3 + 3y4 = 10s + a3.
Thus, the participant P3 himself can recover the secret s by solving the above two linear equations. This
conflicts to the perfectly secure requirement, that is, any one participant can obtain nothing about the
secret s in the information-theoretical sense.
In fact, due to the additional repairing requirement, the shares between different participants have some
correlations, which leads to the failure of perfect security essentially. Since the direct idea cannot achieve
all goals, some other techniques have to be considered. Thus, we further introduce linearized polynomials
as a component to construct repairable secret sharing schemes, because linear operations are preserved
for linearized polynomials to be interpreted below. First, we give the definition of (n, k, d) repairable
threshold secret sharing scheme formally as follows.
Definition 1: A threshold secret sharing scheme (TSSS) is called an (n, k, d) repairable threshold secret
sharing scheme (repairable-TSSS), if the following three conditions are qualified:
1) any k or more out of n participants can recover the secret;
2) any k − 1 or less participants obtain no information about the secret;
3) any d (≥ k1) intact participants can repair any another share of some participant provided that it
fails.
Remark 1: In this paper, the failed share can be repaired by any other d shares, and we always assume
that each of these d participants provides β (< α) symbols for the repair process, where α represents
the size of the share. This implies that, in order to repair a failed share, each participant just provides a
piece of his share for the repair, which is necessary and reasonable in sense of security between shares
since no participant is willing to contribute all of his own share to repair a failed one. In fact, we further
require that all transmitted d pieces of shares together, of size dβ totally, still obtain nothing about the
secret.
1It is natural, as otherwise d < k will lead to a contradiction to the condition 1) in Definition 1.
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Next, we will illustrate our construction of (n, k, d) repairable-TSSSs explicitly below.
Construction:
Step 1: let t =
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d − i)β}, and then select randomly t− 1 elements ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1, in
Fpm independently and uniformly. Then define a linearized polynomial as follows:
f(x) = sx+
t−1∑
i=1
aix
pi ∈ Fpm [x].
Step 2: select t distinct elements xi in Fpm , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, such that they are linearly independent over the
prime field Fp. So it is necessary to require m ≥ t. Then publish xi and compute the evaluation
yi = f(xi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Step 3: let C be an (n, k, d) regenerating code with Fp-valued generator matrix G = [G1, G2, · · · , Gn],
where each Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a t×α full column rank matrix, i.e., Rank(Gi) = α. Each share
si is generated by computing si = [y1, y2, · · · , yt] ·Gi, which is an α-dimensional Fpm-valued
vector. Subsequently, distribute si to Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Notice that C satisfies the repair function
that d intact shares can repair a failed one by providing β symbols for each one.
A. Function Analysis
In the following, we will analyze the functions of recovery of the secret and repair of the failed share.
We will need the following important property before discussion further.
Lemma 2 ( [6, Lemma 3.51]): Let x1, x2, · · · , xn ∈ Fpm, (m ≥ n), then
det


x1 x
p
1 x
p2
1 · · · x
pn−1
1
x2 x
p
2 x
p2
2 · · · x
pn−1
2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xn x
p
n x
p2
n · · · x
pn−1
n


6= 0
if and only if x1, x2, · · · , xn are linearly independent over the prime field Fp.
Theorem 3: For the constructed (n, k, d) repairable-TSSSs, any k participants can recover the secret
s together, and any d intact participants, each of which provides β symbols, can repair a failed share.
Proof: Since C is an (n, k, d) regenerating code, any k participants can recover the t evaluations
y1, y2, · · · , yt. That is, they obtain the following t equations of t variables s, a1, · · · , at−1:
sxj +
t−1∑
i=1
aix
pi
j = yj, 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
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Since x1, x2, · · · , xt are linearly independent over the prime field Fp, together with Lemma 2, the t× t
coefficient matrix
X =


x1 x2 · · · xt
xp1 x
p
2 · · · x
p
t
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
xp
t−1
1 x
pt−1
2 · · · x
pt−1
t


(1)
with respect to the above t linear equations is invertible. Thus, this linear system has a unique solution,
that is, recovers s. Moreover, the repairing function of this TSSS is evident as the repairing property of
the used (n, k, d) regenerating code C. we accomplish the proof.
B. Security Analysis
Next, we will show that our proposed repairable-TSSSs are also perfectly secure, that is, any k − 1
or less participants obtain nothing about the secret. First, we need the following dimension lemma on
regenerating codes. Again, let M be the original data, regarded as a t-dimensional row vector. We consider
an (n, k, d) regenerating code with the t×nα generator matrix G = [G1, G2, · · · , Gn], where each Gi is
a t×α submatrix. Each node Pi stores α linear combinations of the original data M by computing MGi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Wi denote the vector space spanned by the α column vectors of Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
clearly dim(Wi) ≤ α. When a node fails, any other d intact nodes can repair it by providing β symbols
for each one. Thus, it also follows dim(Wi) ≤ dβ.
In order to show the perfectly secure property, we need the following dimension lemma.
Lemma 4: For any (n, k, d) regenerating code with parameters (α, β), let Wi1 , Wi2 , · · · , Wik−1 be
k − 1 vector spaces corresponding to any k − 1 nodes Pi1 , Pi2 , · · · , Pik−1 . Then the dimension of the
summation of these k − 1 vector spaces is strictly smaller than t, i.e., the size of the original data M .
Proof: Consider any k − 1 nodes. Without loss of generality, assume that they are the first k − 1
nodes P1, P2, · · · , Pk−1, and their corresponding vector spaces are W1,W2, · · · ,Wk−1 of dimensions
Ω1,Ω2, · · · ,Ωk−1, respectively. By using the dimension theorem recursively, one has
dim
( k−1∑
i=1
Wi
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
dim
(
Wi
)
−
k−2∑
j=1
dim
(
Wj ∩
k−1∑
i=j+1
Wi
)
. (2)
Further, notice that for any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2, if the node Pj fails, it can be repaired by Pj+1, Pj+2,
· · · , Pk−1 and the other d− (k− 1− j) nodes not including himself Pj . The latter d− (k− 1− j) nodes
provide at most (d− (k− 1− j))β dimensions for the vector space Wj corresponding to the failed node
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Pj . Hence all remaining dimensions of Wj must come from the nodes Pj+1, Pj+2, · · · , Pk−1, i.e.,
dim
(
Wj ∩
k−1∑
i=j+1
Wi
)
≥ max{0,Ωj − (d− (k − 1− j))β}.
Combining with the equality (2), we further have
dim
( k−1∑
i=1
Wi
)
≤
k−1∑
i=1
Ωi −
k−2∑
j=1
max{0,Ωj − (d− (k − 1− j))β}
=Ωk−1 +
k−2∑
j=1
[Ωj −max{0,Ωj − (d− (k − 1− j))β}]
=Ωk−1 +
k−2∑
j=1
min{Ωj , (d− (k − 1− j))β}
≤min{α, dβ} +
k−2∑
j=1
min{α, (d − (k − 1− j))β}
=
k−1∑
j=1
min{α, (d − (k − 1− j))β}
=
k−2∑
i=0
min{α, (d − i)β}
<
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d − i)β} = t,
where the last inequality follows from min{α, (d − (k − 1))β} > 0. This completes the proof.
Theorem 5: The constructed (n, k, d) repairable-TSSSs are perfectly secure.
Proof: For the perfectly secure property, we indicate that any k−1 or less participants cannot obtain
any information about the secret s. By Lemma 4 and our construction, any k − 1 or less participants
correspond to a vector space of dimension less than t, say dimension r and r < t. Let r t-column vectors
~g1, ~g2, · · · , ~gr be arbitrary basis of this vector space, and further
Gˆ =
[
~g1, ~g2, · · · , ~gr
]
,


g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,r
g2,1 g2,2 · · · s2,r
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
gt,1 gt,2 · · · gt,r


,
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which is a t × r full column rank matrix over the prime field Fp. Subsequently, let z1, z2, · · · , zr be r
linear combinations of t evaluations y1, y2, · · · , yt, satisfying
[z1, z2, · · · , zr] = [y1, y2, · · · , yt] · Gˆ.
Further, since
[y1, y2, · · · , yt] = [s, a1, · · · , at−1] ·X,
where X is a t× t invertible matrix over Fpm as defined in (1), we deduce
[z1, z2, · · · , zr] = [y1, y2, · · · , yt] · Gˆ
=[s, a1, · · · , at−1] ·XGˆ
=[s, a1, · · · , at−1]


x1 x2 · · · xt
xp1 x
p
2 · · · x
p
t
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
xp
t−1
1 x
pt−1
2 · · · x
pt−1
t


t×t
·


g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,r
g2,1 g2,2 · · · s2,r
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
gt,1 gt,2 · · · gt,r


t×r
=[s, a1, · · · , at−1] ·


t∑
i=1
gi,1xi
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi · · ·
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi
t∑
i=1
gi,1x
p
i
t∑
i=1
gi,2x
p
i · · ·
t∑
i=1
gi,rx
p
i
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
t∑
i=1
gi,1x
pt−1
i
t∑
i=1
gi,2x
pt−1
i · · ·
t∑
i=1
gi,rx
pt−1
i


t×r
=[s, a1, · · · , at−1] ·


t∑
i=1
gi,1xi
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi · · ·
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi
(
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi)
p (
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi)
p · · · (
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi)
p
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
(
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi)
pt−1 (
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi)
pt−1 · · · (
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi)
pt−1


.
Since Gˆ is full column rank, and xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, are linearly independent over Fp, it follows that∑t
i=1 gi,jxi, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, are also linearly independent over Fp. Together with Lemma 2, it is implied that
XGˆ is still full column rank. Further, we define another matrix
Xˆ =


xp1 x
p
2 · · · x
p
t
xp
2
1 x
p2
2 · · · x
p2
t
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
xp
t−1
1 x
pt−1
2 · · · x
pt−1
t


,
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which is a submatrix of X by deleting the first row of X, and then calculate XˆGˆ of size (t − 1) × r
below:
XˆGˆ =


(
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi)
p (
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi)
p · · · (
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi)
p
(
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi)
p2 (
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi)
p2 · · · (
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi)
p2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
(
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi)
pt−1 (
t∑
i=1
gi,2xi)
pt−1 · · · (
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi)
pt−1


.
By Lemma 2, this matrix XˆGˆ is also full column rank since
(∑t
i=1 gi,jxi
)p
, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, are also linearly
independent over Fp.
Next, we will prove that s is perfectly secure by deducing H(S) = H(S|Z), where S represents the
corresponding random variable of the secret s, and Z = [Z1, Z2, · · · , Zr] denotes the corresponding
random vector of the above r-row vector [z1, z2, · · · , zr]. Herein, H(·) and H(·|·) represent entropy and
conditional entropy, respectively. Thus, in order to show H(S) = H(S|Z), it suffices to prove
Pr(S = s) = Pr(S = s|Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr])
for all possible s and zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, in Fpm .
Subsequently, due to Bayes formula
p(s|z) =
p(s, z)
p(z)
=
p(z|s)p(s)
p(z)
,
it suffices to prove
Pr(Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]) = Pr(Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]|S = s).
Evidently, the event “Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]” is equivalent to the event “S = s,Ai = ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ t−1, such
that [z1, z2, · · · , zr] = [s, a1, · · · , at−1] · XGˆ”, where Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, is the corresponding random
variable of the coefficient ai of xp
i in the used linearized polynomial f(x) = sx+
∑t−1
i=1 aix
pi ∈ Fpm [x],
all of which are independently and uniformly distributed over Fpm . Thus, one obtains
Pr
(
Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]
)
=Pr
(
[S,A1, · · · , At−1] = [s, a1, · · · , at−1] such that
[s, a1, · · · , at−1] ·XGˆ = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]
)
=
(pm)t−r
(pm)t
=
1
(pm)r
, (3)
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where the first equality in (3) follows since the t× r matrix XGˆ is full column rank. Similarly,
Pr
(
Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zr]|S = s
)
=Pr
(
[A1, A2, · · · , At−1] = [a1, a2, · · · , at−1] such that
[a1, a2, · · · , at−1] · XˆGˆ = [z1 − s
t∑
i=1
gi,1xi, · · · , zr − s
t∑
i=1
gi,rxi]
)
=
(pm)t−r−1
(pm)t−1
=
1
(pm)r
, (4)
where similarly the first equality in (4) follows since the (t − 1) × r matrix XˆGˆ is full column rank.
Thus, we further deduce H(S) = H(S|Z), and notice that H(S) = H(S|Z) follows for all such invertible
matrices Gˆ. This shows that any k − 1 participants can obtain no information about the secret, which
indicates the perfectly secure property satisfied. This completes the proof.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF REPAIRABLE-TSSSS
In this section, we focus on the performance analysis of the proposed repairable-TSSSs. Since repairable-
TSSSs contain an additional function of repair, we define a repairing rate below to characterize the
efficiency of repair, which is also important in the aspect of security. For an (n, k, d) repairable-TSSS, if
one share fails, say si, any other d intact participants can repair it. We further use T to denote the index
set of the d participants, say a repairing set. Further, for each j ∈ T , let Rij,T represent the symbols
provided by Pj to repair the failed share si. Now, we can give the definition of the repairing rate.
Definition 2: For a repairable-TSSS, the repairing rate of every participant Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is defined
as the ratio
ρ(i)rep = min{
log2|Si|
log2
∏
j∈T
|Rij,T |
, T ⊆ [n]\{i} with |T | = d},
where [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n}, and Si and Rij,T represent the sets of all possible values taken by si and
Rij,T , respectively. Further, the repairing rate of this scheme is defined as
ρrep = min
1≤i≤n
ρ(i)rep.
Actually, ρ(i)rep is the minimum of the ratios of the number of bits in the share si to the total number
of bits provided by all d participants in T for repairing si amongst all sets T ⊆ [n]\{i} of size d. This
naturally characterizes the efficiency of the repair of Pi. In addition, this repairing rate also describes
the security of the repair, since Pi possibly obtains some extra information about other participants’
shares during the repairing process. The smaller the ρ(i)rep is, the more extra information Pi can obtain.
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Thus, higher repairing rate ρ(i)rep is preferable, so is the repairing rate ρrep. For the repairable-TSSSs,
all shares si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are α-dimensional vectors and each Rij,T , j ∈ T ⊆ [n], can be regarded as
a β-dimensional vector over Fpm , and thus |Si| = pmα and |Rij,T | = pmβ . Consequently, the repairing
rate of the threshold-TSSSs is α/dβ. Note that α ≤ dβ is necessary for successful repair. Hence, the
repairing rate ρrep of the scheme is upper bounded by 1, i.e., ρrep ≤ 1. We say it optimal repairing
rate when this upper bound is achieved. Actually, besides achieving the maximum efficiency of repair, a
repairable-TSSS with optimal repairing rate is more secure. Specifically, if ρrep < 1, that is, α < dβ, the
participant of failed share possibly obtains extra information about other participants’ shares in addition
to the necessary information for the repair. Apparently, this case is not secure enough, since a malicious
participant can always claim his share fails in order to obtain extra information, and after enough repairing
processes, he even possibly obtains enough information to recover the secret s. Thus, we always expect to
use repairable-TSSSs with optimal repairing rate. Furthermore, in secret sharing theory, the information
rate, as a traditional index to characterize the efficiency of the storage performance of secret sharing
schemes, is defined below.
Definition 3 ( [14, Definition 13.4]): For a secret sharing scheme, the information rate for every par-
ticipant Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is defined as the ratio:
ρ
(i)
inf =
log2|S|
log2|Si|
,
where S and Si are the sets of all possible values taken by s and si, respectively. Further, the information
rate of this scheme is defined as:
ρinf = min
1≤i≤n
ρ
(i)
inf .
It is not difficult to see that this rate characterizes the storage efficiency of TSSSs. Next, we discuss
the optimal information rate of the repairable-TSSSs under the optimal repairing rate.
Theorem 6: For the proposed (n, k, d) repairable-TSSSs with optimal repairing rate, i.e., ρrep = 1, the
information rate ρinf is upper bounded by k(2d−k+1)2dt .
Proof: Reviewing our proposed threshold scheme, for a given t, let S and A1, A2, · · · , At−1 be t
random variables corresponding all coefficients of the used linearized polynomial over Fpm , all of which
are chosen independently and uniformly over Fpm . Each share is an α-dimensional vector over Fpm and
the data provided by a participant for repair is regarded as a β-dimensional vector over Fpm . Notice that
the information rate of our scheme is 1/α evidently since |S| = pm and |Si| = pmα, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the
following, it suffices to discuss the lower bound on β, because α = dβ under optimal repairing rate.
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Consider arbitrary k participants. Without loss of generality, assume that they are P1, P2, · · · , Pk and
those random variables representing their shares are S1, S2, · · ·, Sk, respectively. Then, it follows
tH(S) = H(S,A1, · · · , At−1) = H(Sl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k)
≤ H(R1u,T , u ∈ T\{2, · · · , k}, R
1
v,T , v ∈ {2, · · · , k},
Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k) (5)
= H(R1u,T , u ∈ T\{2, · · · , k}, Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k) (6)
≤ H(R1u,T , u ∈ T\{2, · · · , k}) + H(Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k)
≤ (d− (k − 1))βlog2 p
m +H(Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k) (7)
= (d− k + 1)βH(S) + H(Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k),
where T in (5) is a repairing set of S1, containing the indices of P2, P3, · · ·, Pk and other d − (k − 1)
intact participants, and thus the inequality (5) follows because R1u,T , u ∈ T , can repair S1; the equality
(6) follows from the fact H(R1l,T |Sl) = 0 for 2 ≤ l ≤ k; and the inequality (7) follows because each of
R1u,T , u ∈ T\{2, · · · , k}, is regarded as a β-dimensional random vector taking values in F
β
pm . Applying
the same analysis method on H(Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k), we further obtain
H(Sl, 2 ≤ l ≤ k) ≤ (d− k + 2)βH(S) + H(Sl, 3 ≤ l ≤ k).
So far and so forth, we finally obtain
tH(S) ≤
k−1∑
i=0
(d− i)βH(S) =
k(2d − k + 1)
2
βH(S),
which implies β ≥ 2t
k(2d−k+1) , further indicating
ρinf =
log2|S|
log2|Si|
=
1
α
=
1
dβ
≤
k(2d− k + 1)
2dt
.
This completes the proof.
This upper bound in the above theorem is achievable as the following Example 2 to be shown.
Particularly, we have to set t ≥ k(2d−k+1)2 to guarantee β ≥ 1. Further, if β = 1, the information
rate ρinf is equal to 1/d, which only depends on the size of repairing sets. Notice that this rate 1/d will
degrade to 1 provided that the repairing function isn’t considered, which is the optimal information rate
for classical perfect secret sharing schemes (see [14]). If it is allowed that the participant of failed share
obtains some extra information during the repair process, i.e., dβ > α, then the repairing rate ρrep could
decrease while the information rate ρinf would increase. Actually, there is a tradeoff between the repairing
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rate ρrep and the information rate ρinf . At last, we indicate that if we apply the minimum bandwidth
regenerating (MBR) codes (see [3], [7], [12]) in our construction of repairable-TSSSs, the constructed
repairable-TSSSs can achieve the optimal repairing rate and the corresponding optimal information rate. In
the following, we will take an example to design such an optimal (n = 4, k = 2, d = 3) repairable-TSSS
with parameters (α = 3, β = 1) by our Construction.
Example 2: Consider a primitive polynomial h(x) = x5 + x2 + 1 over the prime field F2. Let ω
be a root of this primitive polynomial and further be a primitive element of the extended field F25 .
Furthermore, select a linearized polynomial:
f(x) = sx+
4∑
i=1
aix
2i = ωx+
4∑
i=1
x2
i
∈ F25 [x],
where, without loss of generality, let the secret be s = ω. Then choose 5 distinct elements 1, ω, ω2, ω3,
ω4 in F25 , evidently that are linearly independent over F2. Subsequently, compute 5 evaluations:
f(1) = ω, f(ω) = ω19, f(ω2) = ω20,
f(ω3) = ω25, f(ω4) = ω22.
On the other hand, we use a (4, 2, 3) MBR code with (α = 3, β = 1), whose public generator matrix is
given by:
G =[G1|G2|G3|G4]
=


1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1


.
Each participant Pi obtains his share
si = [f(1), f(ω), f(ω
2), f(ω3), f(ω4)] ·Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4,
that is,
s1 = [ω, ω
19, ω20], s2 = [ω, ω
25, ω22],
s3 = [ω
19, ω25, ω2], s4 = [ω
20, ω22, ω2].
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It is easy to verify that any 2 participants can recover the secret. As an example, we take the participants
P2 and P3 into account. For P2 and P3, the following system of linear equations is true:
[s2, s3] = [f(1), f(ω), f(ω
2), f(ω3), f(ω4)] · [G2|G3], (8)
and specifically,
[ω, ω25, ω22, ω19, ω25, ω2] = [ω, ω19, ω20, ω25, ω22] · [G2|G3].
Notice that the matrix [G2|G3] is full row rank.
In addition, it follows:
[s, a1, a2, a3, a4] ·X = [f(1), f(ω), f(ω
2), f(ω3), f(ω4)], (9)
where
X =


1 ω ω2 ω3 ω4
1 ω2 (ω2)2 (ω3)2 (ω4)2
1 ω2
2
(ω2)2
2
(ω3)2
2
(ω4)2
2
1 ω2
3
(ω2)2
3
(ω3)2
3
(ω4)2
3
1 ω2
4
(ω2)2
4
(ω3)2
4
(ω4)2
4


=


1 ω ω2 ω3 ω4
1 ω2 ω4 ω6 ω8
1 ω4 ω8 ω12 ω16
1 ω8 ω16 ω24 ω
1 ω16 ω ω17 ω2


is a 5× 5 invertible matrix. Combining (8) and (9), P2 and P3 can obtain the following system of linear
equations:
[s, a1, a2, a3, a4] ·X[G2|G3]
=[f(1), f(ω), f(ω2), f(ω3), f(ω4)] · [G2|G3]
=[ω, ω25, ω22, ω19, ω25, ω2]. (10)
Since, as mentioned above, X is invertible and [G2|G3] is full row rank, X · [G2|G3] is still full row rank.
Therefore, P2 and P3 can solve the secret s = ω from the system (10) of linear equations (actually, solve
all s = ω, and ai = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). In other words, the recovery property is satisfied. Furthermore, by a
simple observation, one can see that any failed share can be repaired by obtaining one encoded symbol
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from each of arbitrary other 3 intact shares, i.e., β = 1. For instance, suppose that the share s4 fails, P1,
P2, and P3 provide ω20, ω22, and ω2 to P4, respectively. Then P4 recovers his share s4 = [ω20, ω22, ω2].
In addition, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, it is not difficult to see that, for any a ∈ F25 , the number of solutions,
with the form [a, a1, a2, a3, a4], of the linear equation
[a, a1, a2, a3, a4] ·XGi = si
is equal. This implies that the perfectly secure property is qualified for this repairable-TSSS.
Finally, for this repairable-TSSS, the repairing rate and the information rate of the scheme are respec-
tive:
ρrep =
α
dβ
=
3
3× 1
= 1,
and
ρinf =
k(2d − k + 1)
2dt
=
1
3
,
herein, k = 2, d = 3, t = 5, which achieves the optimal repairing rate and the corresponding optimal
information rate.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the repair problem of shares in threshold secret sharing schemes without
the help of the dealer. We present a construction of repairable-TSSSs, which can accomplish the defined
repairing function when a share fails and still guarantee all required properties of TSSSs, particularly, per-
fectly secure property. Finally, we analyze the performance of repairable threshold schemes by discussing
the introduced repairing rate and traditional information rate, and indicate our proposed construction can
obtain such optimal repairable-TSSSs by applying appropriate MBR codes.
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